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RIGHTS, CAPABILITIES,
AND THE GOOD SOCIETY
Robin West*
INTRODUCTION

What is a "good society," as opposed to a just one, and what is
demanded of the state by the demand of "goodness" in a good
society? Must a state in a good society ensure for its citizens the
minimal material preconditions of a decent life? Is it obligated to do
so? Many of course, think not, but of those who think there is such an
obligation, there are a variety of reasons, or arguments proffered, as
to why. One "civic republican" argument, revitalized over the last
fifteen years by Michael Sandel,' is basically instrumental. A state, in
a good society, might be obligated to ensure for its citizens some
minimal
level of material goods, but if so, it is required to do so in
order to instill some threshold level of civic virtue: in a good society,
citizens must be able to be free and equal participants in the collective
project of self rule, and if some threshold level of material well-being
is necessary
for that participation, then the state is obligated to
2
provide it.
A quite different and perhaps more basic sort of response, held by
scores of liberal, progressive, and radical legal theorists over the last
century, as well as innumerable political activists and state actors,
might be called a "welfarist" conception-the state, in a good society,
is directly, not just instrumentally, obligated to ensure that all citizens
enjoy some minimal threshold level of material well-being, or welfare,
or met needs, or access to primary goods.' They must enjoy this
minimal threshold, furthermore, not because such a threshold is
necessary to the exercise of the various civic virtues required of them
* Professor

of Law, Georgetown University Law Center.
1. See Michael J. Sandel, Democracy's Discontent: America in Search of a Public
Philosophy (1996) [hereinafter Sandel, Democracy's Discontent].
2. Id. at 124-28, 329-38.
3. See, e.g., Frank I. Michelman, Constitutional Welfare Rights: One View of
Rawls' Theory of Justice, 121 U. Pa. L. Rev. 962 (1973) [hereinafter, Michelman,
Constitutional Welfare Rights]; Frank I. MiEchelman, The Supreme Court 1968 TermForward-On Protecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 Harv. L
Rev. 7 (1969) [hereinafter Michelman, On Protecting the Poor]. The welfarist
conception is heavily indebted to John Rawls' early work, particularly A Theory of
Justice (1971).
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if they are to participate as free and equals in a liberal state, nor for
any other instrumental reason.4 More basically, the state must ensure
some minimal level of well-being because such a threshold is
necessary if citizens are to live fully human lives and have the dignity
to which their humanity entitles them.5 Many citizens of even
prosperous democratic states cannot possibly enjoy such a minimal
threshold, furthermore, without some state involvement in the
distribution of resources, particularly with the inequalities that persist
and threaten to worsen today. 6 States are required, by justice and
goodness both, to treat citizens with dignity, and with equal dignity at
that. Therefore, welfarists conclude, the state is obligated to do
whatever it takes to provide that minimal level of well-being to each
of its citizens.7
In a number of books and articles over the last ten years, Martha
Nussbaum and Amartya Sen have carved out a third position, which,
they argue, is in greater accord with liberal commitments to individual
autonomy, and particularly the autonomous right of individuals to
determine their own conceptions of the good.8 The state, Nussbaum
and Sen argue, as a matter of goodness and justice both, must not
ensure minimal welfare directly-that would indeed be unduly
paternalistic, illiberal, and in important respects, impossible: a state
cannot ensure, say, a healthy, long life for each citizen.9 Rather, a
decent and liberal state in a good society must ensure that citizens
achieve and enjoy certain fundamental human capabilities (thereby
leaving to the citizens the choice whether or not to avail themselves of
those capabilities) -including the capability to live a safe, wellnourished, productive, educated, social, and politically and culturally
participatory life of normal length. 10 Thus, to be "fully human,"
Nussbaum argues, and to be possessed of the full dignity that one's
humanity implies, just is to enjoy this minimal threshold level of
capability." If they are to have fully human lives, citizens must have
access to, and the capability to attain, non-alienating, nondiscriminatory and non-humiliating work." They must have, or have
the capability to acquire, various welfare goods such as decent health
4. See e.g., Sandel, Democracy's Discontent, supra note 1, at 330-32.
5. See e.g., Michelman, On Protectingthe Poor,supra note 3, at 13-14.

6. Id. at 13-15.
7. Id.
8. See Martha Nussbaum, Women and Human Development 11-15, 111-61
(2000) [hereinafter Nussbaum, Women and Human Development]; Amartya Sen,
Rights as Goals, in Equality and Discrimination: Essays in Freedom and Justice 14-19
(Stephen Guest & Alan Milne eds., 1985).
9. Nussbaum, Women and Human Development, supra note 8, at 51-60, 81; Sen,
supra note 8, at 15-16.
10. Nussbaum, Women and Human Development, supra note 8, at 75-83; Sen,
supra note 8, at 16.
11. Nussbaum, Women and Human Development, supra note 8, at 75-83.
12. Id.
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care, adequate food, shelter, and clothing. 3 They must have a good
and liberal education, a safe upbringing, protection against physical
and sexual assault, and security in their intimate and affiliative
associations. Citizens must have access to the material preconditions
of these capabilities, if they are to have the ability to live fully human
lives.' 4
Furthermore, Nussbaum argues, for many or even all of us, these
preconditions cannot be met without considerable state and
community assistance, or more pointedly, without considerable staterun redistribution and regulation. 15 These are not preconditions
readily satisfied in either a state of nature or a minimally regulated
social order. A good society, therefore, Nussbaum concludes, and a
liberal, just society, is one in which the state is not just permitted, but
is obligated to ensure, on behalf of its citizens, that these material
preconditions of our fundamental human capabilities are met. 6 All
states, particularly liberal states, ought to regard their obligation to
secure the preconditions of basic human capabilities as fundamental
and as required by justice."
Liberal states should regard their
obligation to secure the minimal material preconditions of the basic
human capabilities to be a basic constitutionalduty.is
I do not want to take issue with the basic welfarist version of the
good society thesis, or with Nussbaum's more liberal, antipaternalist,
"capabilities-based" (rather than primary goods-based) approach.
Rather, I assume the welfarist thesis, and for reasons that I think will
become clear, I take Nussbaum's "capabilities" approach to be its best
account. In this essay, I want instead to re-open what some might
regard as a stale question: whether individual, constitutional rights, as
they have been understood by liberal theorists, and as they have been
employed and are now employed in various constitutional liberal
democracies, might be a vehicle for securing those state obligations.
Briefly, if justice and goodness require that liberal states have an
obligation to secure the minimal preconditions of our fundamentally
human capabilities, as Nussbaum argues, and also require that states
respect citizens' rights, as countless liberals assert, then doesn't it
follow that citizens in liberal states have a right to enjoy those
capabilities, and a right to a state obligated to commit itself to
ensuring them? More to the point, does it not follow that welfare or
capabilities advocates should be arguing as much?
In the last twenty-five years, a sort of conventional wisdom has
emerged, at least in the legal academy, that the answer to both of
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

Id.; Sen, supra note 8, at 15-16.
Nussbaum, Women and Human Development, supra note 8, at 86-87.
d at 54-55, 91.
Id. at 74-75, 89-90.
Id.
1& at 74.
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these questions must be "no." According to Amartya Sen himself,19
some liberal rights theorists,' scores of "rights critics" from the
critical legal studies movement, 21 and a handful of Sandelian critics of
liberal proceduralism who are committed to some version of a
welfarist conception of the good society,2 liberal rights, for better or
for worse, but virtually by definition, are all obstacles to, rather than a
possible vehicle for, any welfarist effort-even Nussbaum's
liberalized, capabilities-based version. There is good reason for this
remarkably widespread consensus. Liberal-constitutional rights, as
they are now conventionally understood and authoritatively
interpreted, at least in the United States, do not obligate the state to
ensure anything resembling what welfarist "good society" advocates
envision, whether put in terms of primary goods, civic virtue, or
fundamental human capabilities-or at least, they have never been
construed that way.
Worse, liberal constitutional rights, as they are sometimes
authoritatively interpreted in this country and others, actually limit
the state's authority to take action to secure the material
preconditions of the good society. According to some strands of
liberal rights theory as construed by at least some United States
constitutional and legal theorists, individual rights on the one hand,
and the state's obligation to ensure the minimal material
preconditions of either well-being, civic virtue, or capabilities on the
other, do not support one another but rather inevitably collide. And
individual rights trump state's obligations. Essentially and inevitably
then, liberal rights undercut, rather than support, efforts to even
conceive, much less achieve, an obligatory state role to secure general
well-being. As liberal rights expand, any state role, including any
19. See Sen, supra note 8, at 11, 19. Nussbaum is more ambivalent. Although she
has addressed the relationship between capabilities approaches to liberalism and
human rights, and has elsewhere described the obligation of states to provide for

minimal capabilities as "constitutional," she does not directly argue that citizens in
liberal states have a constitutional right to the minimal material conditions of
fundamental human capabilities. See Martha C. Nussbaum, Capabilitiesand Human
Rights, 66 Fordham L. Rev. 273, 287-88 (1997); see also Nussbaum, Women and
Human Development, supra note 8, at 97-101.
20. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Takings: Private Property and the Power of
Eminent Domain 295 (1985).
21. For a sampling of the voluminous literature criticizing rights on these and
related grounds, see, e.g., Mary E. Becker, The Politics of Women's Wrongs and the
Bill of "Rights": A BicentennialPerspective, 59 U. Chi. L. Rev. 453, 454 (1992); Peter
Gabel, The Phenomenology of Rights-Consciousness and the Pact of the Withdrawn
Selves, 62 Tex. L. Rev. 1563, 1595-97 (1984); Morton J. Horwitz, Rights, 23 Harv.
C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 393, 402-04 (1988); Mark Tushnet, An Essay on Rights, 62 Tex. L.
Rev. 1363, 1386-92 (1984).
22. William A. Galston, PoliticalEconomy and the Politics of Virtue: U.S. Public
Philosophy at Century's End, in Debating Democracy's Discontent: Essays on
American Politics, Law, and Public Philosophy 63, 74-77 (Anita L. Allen & Milton C.
Regan, Jr. eds., 1998).
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obligatory role, contracts. This result would hold were well-being
defined in terms of capabilities rather than basic human goods or civic
virtue. The good society, and the state's obligation to ensure that
citizens have access to the minimal capabilities necessary to
participate in it, must then be both conceived and achieved by
recourse to some means other than rights.
In Part I this essay explores and then criticizes the two major
arguments behind the conventional wisdom that rights undermine
efforts to secure a state role in ensuring the material preconditions for
a good society, and therefore, the material preconditions for the
development of those human capabilities essential to a fully human
life. I conclude in this part that this understanding of rights is
mistaken.
In Part II, I urge that the pragmatic argument put forward by rights
critics and some welfare advocates for forgoing rights-talk and rightsrhetoric also fails: there are very real costs, both in theory and in law,
in deciding to forgo putting the case for the state's obligation to
provide minimal material goods in terms of rights.
In Part III, I briefly describe two core rights that a refashioned
liberal state, understood as a vehicle for protecting not just the liberty
but also the capabilities of citizens, should recognize: first, a right to
be protected against private violence, and second, a right of caregivers
to give care to dependents without incurring the risk of severe
impoverishment or subordination-a right, to use the provocative
phrase coined by the philosopher Eva Kittay, to doulia.3 Both rights,
I think, are directly entailed by the state's obligation to provide the
minimal preconditions for the development of those fundamental
human capabilities that are themselves essential to a fully human life.
Both rights however, could be and should be conceived in the most
The first such right-the right to
traditionally liberal terms.
protection against private violence-although now disfavored in
United States rights discourse, seems fully authorized by both the
liberal tradition and the American Constitution itself. The second
right for which I will argue-the right to provide care to dependentshas no similar basis of support in either liberal theory or American
constitutionalism. It is not incompatible with either, however, and is
at least arguably required by the deepest commitments of both. The
right to protection and the right to care are rights that can be framed
in liberal terms, and both rights would go a long way toward securing
for individual citizens the minimal preconditions of a good society.

23. Eva Feder Kittay,
Dependency 70 (1999).

Love's Labor- Essays
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Equality, and
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I. NEGATIVE RIGHTS AND THE GOOD SOCIETY
A. Liberal Rights
Liberal, constitutional rights, according to their legions of critics
and numerous rights theorists, undercut any state obligation to secure
the preconditions for the fundamental human capabilities for two
basic and interconnected reasons. The first is political. The good
society, as envisioned by virtually all "good society" theorists, requires
substantial state intervention into various "private" spheres, and
substantial redistribution of the goods, resources, and power found in
those spheres. 24 Liberal rights, as defended and constructed by
contemporary constitutional theorists and jurists both, limit the power
of states to do precisely that. Were a state to go about the task of
ensuring the material preconditions of a good life for all, or, in the
Nussbaumian version of the same idea, ensuring the preconditions for
the capabilities which are themselves requisite to a "fully human life,"
it would have to break down the walls of insularity that liberal rights,
both in theory and to a considerable degree in practice, protect. To
secure the minimal preconditions of the good society for all of us, the
state would have to violate the rights we hold as individuals- rights of
liberty, property, contract, and privacy. Indeed, not only do we lack a
"right" to a state obligated to ensure minimal preconditions of a good
society-whether the "good society" is as envisioned by Karl Marx,
John Dewey, Michael Sandel, Frank Michelman, William Forbath, or
Martha Nussbaum-but if anything, we have a right to a state that
does not attempt to ensure that the material preconditions of a good
society are met. Rights protect us against the paternalistic state that
might otherwise regard the "good society" as its business.
Furthermore, rights deter the creation of a state interested in good
society ambitions by structural design, not because they are misused
by Machiavellian political actors. In many liberal states, and virtually
by definition in the United States, rights are overwhelmingly negative.
We have whatever rights we have, against the state, and against the
24. Most famously, of course, Rawls argued that liberal states are obligated to
redistribute toward equality up to the point where remaining inequalities benefit the

least well off. John Rawls, A Theory of Justice 100-02 (1971); see also Nussbaum,
Women and Human Development, supra note 8, at 55, 91-95, 105 (comparing
redistributive measures in India and the United States); Sandel, Democracy's
Discontent, supra note 1, at 255-56 (discussing Franklin D. Rooselvelt's tax proposals
of 1935); William E. Forbath, Caste, Class, and Equal Citizenship, 98 Mich. L. Rev. 1,
8 (1999) (reviewing the legal arguments regarding redistributive rights and remedies);
Michelman, Constitutional Welfare Rights, supra note 3, at 966 (discussing "specific
welfare guaranty"); Michelman, On Protectingthe Poor,supra note 3, at 9 (discussing
"minimum welfare").
25. See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 20, at 337-38; Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and
Utopia 26-53 (1974). See generally, Horwitz, supra note 21 (discussing the concept of
constitutional rights as developed by the courts since the 1930s).
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state's actions, and against the state's actors; we do not have rights
that positively obligate the state to do something. We do not have
rights that require, rather than forbid, the state to take some action. It
is, of course, because we have rights against the state (and only against
the state) rather than rights to some particular sort of state action or
state intervention, that rights protect the individual against an
overreaching state in the manner celebrated by rights advocates. But
it is also because of their negativity that rights preclude the state from
taking any role in securing to citizens the material preconditions of the
good society.
Negative rights thus disempower the state from pernicious,
intermeddling, paternalistic, or malign intervention into the private
affairs of individual citizens. By virtue of so doing, however, negative
rights also disempower the state from intervening into the private
sphere for the democratically progressive purpose of redistributing
power or resources within it. Negative rights elevate or empower the
citizen relative to an overreaching, paternalistic state. Yet by staying
the paternalist's intervening hand, negative rights both subordinate
that citizen to his stronger brother-thereby entrenching private
inequalities-and disable the state from securing, on behalf of weaker
citizens, the material preconditions to developing the capabilities
necessary to a fully human life. Good society theorists, rights critics,
and a number of liberal rights theorists, have all concluded from this
argument that rights, as conceived and employed in at least United
States liberal and constitutional jurisprudence, are fundamentally at
odds with any purported state obligation to ensure the material
preconditions of a good society. If this conclusion is correct, then it
obviously holds for a capabilities approach to welfarism as well. If so,
the state's obligation to promote conditions that secure the minimal
capabilities essential to a fully human life, even if such an obligation
exists, would have to be secured by some means other than individual
rights.
But is this analysis correct? Perhaps not: the conclusion seems
overbroad on three counts. First, there is nothing about a right that
logically requires that it be understood as a constraint on state action,
forbidding interference with individual spheres of privacy or liberty,
rather than as a state obligation entitling the individual to state
intervention in the name of welfare, capabilities, or basic goods. The
notion of a positive right may be disfavored in contemporary liberal
discourse, but it is by no means oxymoronic. Ronald Dworkin, in his
seminal, mid-seventies writings on liberal constitutional rights, did
focus-indeed overwhelmingly-upon rights that follow from the
moral constraints on liberal states. 26 But he suggested no reason to
26. Ronald Dworkin. Taking Rights Seriously vii-xv, 184-205 (1977) [hereinafter
Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously].
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define rights in such a way, and at any rate, nothing in the remainder
of his powerful jurisprudential treatment of rights depends on it. A
right could readily be defined as including both the individual
entitlement that follows from the moral obligations of liberal states
and the entitlement that follows from constraints upon the states. In
other words, rights could be defined as the individual entitlements
that follow from what states are morally required to do and what
liberal states are morally prohibited from doing.27
Doing so,
furthermore, would seem to be consistent with the robust Kantian
moral imperative that, according to both Dworkin and Nussbaum,
underlies liberalism: that every individual must be accorded equal
dignity, equal concern, and equal respect.28 To accord all individuals
dignity, concern, and respect, sometimes requires the state to refrain
from acting, and sometimes requires it to act.
The connection, in other words, between the liberal idea of rights
and the constraint of negativity is contingent, not inherently logical.
Thus, rights have at different times and for different subcultures in
American history, been widely understood as positive rather than
negative in character. To conceive of rights as either positive or
negative, depending upon contingent political necessity, would be
consistent with those perhaps forgotten parts of our histories.29 It
would also be consistent with common usage in much of the rest of the
world. Any number of liberal states, as Mary Ann Glendon and
others have amply demonstrated, recognize positive rights, although
not always in conjunction with the entailment of judicial enforcement
and remedies for their breach." Nevertheless, the rights so recognized
have political meaning and impact, and more to the point, the
societies that recognize them do not noticeably sacrifice their
liberality by doing so. Again, the connection between rights and
negativity inheres in American history. It does not follow from the
nature of a right itself.
Second, a recognition that rights might sometimes be positive
entitlements to state action, as well as, at other times, negative
entitlements to be free of state action, is truer to the philosophical
liberal classics that animate the liberal tradition than the insistence of
liberal constitutional rights theorists on the essential negativity of
rights. Let me start with Thomas Hobbes. Hobbes regarded the
positive obligation of the state to protect individuals against private
27. Dworkin suggests as much. See id. at 193.
28. See id. at 180-83, 272-78; Nussbaum, Women and Human Development, supra
note 8, at 73.
29. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Forty Acres and a Mule: A Republican Theory of

Minimal Entitlements, 13 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 37, 39 (1990); Elizabeth B. Clark,
Religion, Rights, and Difference in the Early Woman's Rights Movement, 3 Wis.

Women's L.J. 29,46-53 (1987); Forbath, supra note 24, at 4-5.
30. See Mary Ann Glendon, Rights in Twentieth-Century Constitutions,59 U. Chi.

L. Rev. 519, 521,523-30 (1992).
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violence as being at the heart of the social contract. The individual's
right to that protection was the only "right" created by the transition
from nature into civil society. Otherwise, the Hobbesian Leviathan
can do what it wishes and the individual citizen must submit-the
Hobbesian citizen does indeed lack negative rights. This is not so,
however, with respect to the state's duty to protect the individual
against private violence: there, the state is bound to act affirmatively,
and the individual is fully entitled to a positive right. This positive
right of the citizen to the state's affirmative action was by no means a
peripheral feature of Hobbes' jurisprudence. Rather, the bargain
struck-the individual relinquishes self help, in exchange for the
state's obligation to protect him from violence-was, for Hobbes, the
raison d'8tre of the state's existence. The Leviathan's protection of
the individual against the private violence of others is the quid pro
quo for the individual's relinquishment of his right to self-help
available to him in the state of nature.' The individual, in other
words, is just as contractually entitled to receive that protection as the
state is obligated to provide it-in short, the citizen has a right to it.
The state's obligation to protect the citizen against private violence
and the citizen's continuing right to receive it, in Hobbes' view, was
foundational and inalienable. If we take Hobbes seriously, the
individual has a right to the state's protection against the violence or
aggression of other private parties-for Hobbes, this was, to borrow a
phrase from Steven Heyman's important article on this point, the
"first duty of government. -2
If we again take Hobbes seriously, the right to that protection is
positive in character. The state is required to do something-to
protect the individual-not just to refrain from doing something. If
Hobbes was right about this, which I think he was, and if this very
positive right to protection against private violence is central, rather
than peripheral, to the metaphoric "social contract" so fundamental to
liberalism, then the distinctively modern claim that liberal rights are
essentially negative-whether insisted by rights proponents, rights
critics, Fourth Circuit or Seventh Circuit Judges, or Supreme Court
Justices-is mistaken, and even perverse. At least according to
Thomas Hobbes, the core, foundational right to which the liberal state
owes its existence is indisputably positive in character.
And what of Locke? As Epstein and other property rights
advocates rightly insist,3 Locke substantially modified the Hobbesian
picture. For Locke, but not for Hobbes, the individual brings to the
civil state rights of property bestowed by nature, which have the effect

31. Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan 165 (J.M. Dent & Sons Ltd. 1928) (1651).
32. Steven J. Heyman, The First Duty of Government: Protection, Liberty and the
Fourteenth Amendment,41 Duke L.J. 507. 508 (1991).
33. Epstein, supra note 20, at 7-10.
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of significantly limiting state sovereignty. 4 The tying of modern
liberalism to these "negative rights" that bar the state from acting in
various impermissible ways stems from Locke's writings, roughly in
the way Epstein describes.35 But Locke at no point repudiated the
Hobbesian positive right of the citizen to state protection against
private violence. In fact, he expressly endorsed and expanded it. For
Locke, the citizen has the right to expect and demand more from the
state than just protection against violence, he also has the right to
expect governance in accordance with rules, and indifferent and
impartial adjudication.36 At no point, though, does Locke urge that
the core, Hobbesian, positive right to the protection of the state
should be displaced with a set of negative rights limiting state power.
He urged, rather, that the relation of state and citizen be construed as
constituted by both. The individual gives up natural powers of
dominion, punishment, and adjudication, while the state acquires the
power to administer these functions, but only toward proper ends. 7
The citizen, from a Lockean perspective and a Hobbesian perspective,
has rights, logically positive in character, to a state that acts in ways
conducive to his safety, not just negative rights to insist on restraints.
Other prominent liberal theorists have also quite explicitly
embraced the joint claims that the state has positive obligations and
the individual has positive rights, and have expanded the list well
beyond the Hobbesian positive right to protection against private
violence. John Stuart Mill and John Dewey both insisted upon what
we would today recognize as liberal welfare rights to the minimal
preconditions of a good life, broadly construed. According to Mill
and Dewey, the individual has rights the liberal state must recognize
and act on, not only to safety and food and shelter, but also to
meaningful work, a decent and liberal education, and participation in
society's political, civic, and cultural life.
Even Isaiah Berlin,
perhaps the harshest twentieth century critic of positive rights, stated
in his celebrated essay on the topic that his fears of overintrusive
states did not go so far as to obliterate the state's positive obligation to
ensure, and the individual's positive right to receive, a threshold level
of minimal well-being.39 Indeed, there may be no important classical
liberal theorist either of "rights" or of states, prior to the libertarian
interventions of Robert Nozick and his followers that insists on the tie
34. Id. at 7-15.
35. See id.
36. John Locke, An Essay Concerning the True Original, Extent and End of Civil
Government §§ 128-31 (Henry Regnery Co. 1949) (1690).
37. Id.
38. See John Dewey, Liberalism and Social Action (Capricorn Books 1963)
(1935); John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism,in Utilitarianism, Liberty and Representative
Government 66-67 (E.P. Dutton & Co. 1950) (1863).
39. Isaiah Berlin, Two Concepts of Liberty, in Four Essays on Liberty 123-24, 164-

65, 169 (1969).
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between rights and negativity that has become such an entrenched
part of the contemporary American constitutional mindset.
Third, the negativity of rights is neither required nor justified by the
American Constitution, as a number of constitutional theorists and
historians have now shown. ° This is a large debate beyond the scope
of this symposium, but two points are worth quickly noting here. The
first is logical. The widely shared conviction that "the American
Constitution is one of negative rights only" seems to rest largely on
the mistaken assumption that because the Constitution's Bill of Rights
addresses States, and not private actors, it therefore only consists of
negative rights. 1 The state action requirement, in other words, is said
to preclude not only the possibility that the Constitution reaches
private actors as well as state actors, but also that the Constitution
cannot reach state inaction as well as state action. But this inference
is unwarranted. Regardless of whether the Constitution contains a
"state action" requirement that limits the Constitution's reach to state
actors, it does not follow from such a requirement that the rights
contained are necessarily negative in character. A positive right, no
less than a negative right, would be directed at states and not private
actors. The difference between them is that a positive right would
condemn as unconstitutional state inaction rather than state action,
not that it would extend the Constitution's reach to private actors.
The difference between positive and negative rights, in other words, is
not that the former would impose constitutional constraints on private
actors.
And finally, both the history and the plain language support rather
than undercut the existence-even the prominence-of positive rights
in the Constitution. The plain language of the text of the Fourteenth
Amendment contemplates state inaction rather than action as its main
target. The first sentence of Section 1 declares that "No State shall
deny" various entitlements. It may be unfortunate that the drafters
chose to use a double negative, but the meaning is not obscure. If no
state is allowed to deny, then all states must provide. And what states
must provide,.again according to the clause's plain text, is protection
of the law-and equal protection at that.
Historically, the
Amendment's insistence that states must provide protection of the law
was the result, in part, of the inaction of the states to protect both the
safety and civil rights of freed slaves4 2 The Fourteenth Amendment,
40. Susan Bandes, The Negative Constitution:A Critique, 88 Mich. L Rev. 2271,
2308-27 (1990); Heyman, supra note 32, at 526.
41. The clearest explication of this mistaken conception is found in Judge Posner's
decision in Bowers v. DeVito, 686 F.2d 616, 618 (7th Cir. 1982). The opinion states,
"The Constitution is a charter of negative liberties; it tells the state to let people
alone." Id. Tribe makes the same criticism of this view as is found in this essay.
Laurence H. Tribe, Constitutional Choices 247 (1985).
42. See Jacobus TenBroek, Equal Under Law 57-58 (First Collier Books 1965)
(1951).
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in short, plainly provides for positive individual rights and explicit
state obligations both.
B. Rights'Atomism
The second major way in which rights undercut efforts to secure a
state obligation to ensure the minimal material preconditions of those
human capabilities themselves requisite to the enjoyment of a fully
human life, according to our major rights critics and good society
theorists, is existential: it goes to how rights envision and then
construct our self-identity. Rights and rights-consciousness render us
unduly atomized. In liberal societies that take rights seriously,
individuals are described as, and then tragically become, isolated from
each other in individualized rights-spun cocoons, increasingly
incapable of even approaching each other, much less achieving any
meaningful moral or political empathic connections with fellow
citizens. 3 No less than their negativity, rights' atomism also undercuts
attempts to secure the material preconditions for the basic human
capabilities in three ways.
First, for there to be a state obligation to provide for minimal
capabilities requisite to a fully human life, at least in a democratic
state in which state actors, and hence the "state" itself, are some
subset of citizens, there must exist the political will for it. That will, in
turn, requires some degree of communal solidarity among citizens.
Rights, however, disincline us to even regard each other, much less
assume responsibility for each others' welfare. Rights erode rather
than enhance our feelings of obligation toward our neighbors, cocitizens, and arguably even our intimates and family members. Rights
leave us identified with our possessions, rather than with each other.
For that reason alone, they seriously undercut the empathic solidarity
necessary to sustain a democratic case for a state obligation to provide
for the well-being of others.
Second, at least some of the material preconditions of human
capabilities which a good state is obligated to provide are those
preconditions for our capability for social affiliation or connection
with others, and mutual and moral responsibility for each others' well
being.' To live a fully human life, according to Nussbaum and others,
means in part to have the capability to live responsibly and safely with

43. See Sandel, Democracy's Discontent, supra note 1, at 16-17; Gabel, supra note
21, at 1572-76; Glendon, supra note 30, at 520-23; Michael J. Sandel, The Constitution
of the ProceduralRepublic: Liberal Rights and Civic Virtues, 66 Fordham L. Rev. 1, 46 (1997) [hereinafter, Sandel, Constitution of the Procedural Republic]; Michael J.
Sandel, Moral Argument and Liberal Toleration:Abortion and Homosexuality, 77 Cal.
L. Rev. 521, 523-25 (1989) [hereinafter Sandel, Moral Argument and Liberal
Toleration].
44. Nussbaum, Women and Human Development, supra note 8, at 79.
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and for others, at work, at home, and in the community! - The
capability for doing just that, then, is part of what a just state is
obligated to ensure, if the state is obligated to ensure the minimal
material preconditions of a good society. The atomism that is at the
core of liberal understandings of rights, however, implies at most an
atomistic individual in need of rights of isolation, of privacy, and of
individuation; not rights that might stem from a frank recognition of
our social or relational nature. In terms of capabilities, current rights
rhetoric implies that the capability for autonomy is the core capability
in need of protection through rights, to the virtual exclusion of
relational capabilities. Because of the power of modern individualistic
rights rhetoric, we not only lack "relational rights" that might bolster
our social capabilities, but we become disinclined to even envision or
argue for them. In an atomistic rights culture, we come to view
ourselves, and then increasingly come to be, possessors of individual
rights against each other and the state. We are not only without any
responsibilities toward others, but also without any rights to ensure
that we have the capabilities to safely exercise those responsibilities
toward others. As a result, we come to identify our "rights" -- our
most precious political entitlements, and hence our political identityas rights to individuate and distance or sever ourselves from, rather
than rights to safely connect or relate to, our families, intimates,
communities, or co-citizens.
Third, for the state to have an obligation to ensure the minimal
preconditions for the development of fundamental human capabilities
themselves essential to a fully human life, the state obviously cannot
be entirely "neutral" toward competing conceptions of the good life.
It must, rather, be committed to a vision of the good as defined by
those human capabilities, and obligated to achieve it. But the same
atomistic understanding of individual nature that drives liberalism's
commitment to individualistic rights also is behind its signature
insistence on state neutrality toward competing conceptions of the
good life. Because we each individually and idiosyncratically author
our own understanding of the good-the state, or the community, or
the collective, is obviously incapacitated from doing so on our behalf. "
The resulting insistence on state neutrality toward competing
conceptions of the good renders liberalism, as a politics, peculiarly
moot on issues regarding the nature of the good society and
incapacitated in the task of bringing it to fruition. The result is not
only alienated individuals, but also a sterile reluctance on the part of
45. Id.
46. Sandel draws out the implications of this connection most clearly. See Sandel,
Democracy's Discontent, supra note 1, at 25-54. Michael Sandel, A Reply to Critics,in
Debating Democracy's Discontent: Essays on American Politics, Law, and Public
Philosophy 319, 319-23 (Anita L. Allen & Milton C. Regan, Jr. eds., 1998 [hereinafter
Sandel, A Reply to Critics].

1914

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 69

liberal states to endorse some conceptions of the good over others,
even where such a commitment seems warranted and in the national
interest. More fundamentally, it leaves the liberal state with no role
to play, even in theory, in the creation of a good society. The
individual has a "right" not to the material preconditions of a good
life, but to a state fundamentally disinterested in committing itself to
that project. For this existential, identity-based reason as well, then,
rights critics and welfarists have concluded that "rights-talk" is a part
of the problem rather than part of the solution. Rights construct us in
such a way as to guarantee our disinterest or hostility toward any state
obligation to ensure the good society, and the "we" that is
disinterested or hostile to such a project is the "we" that would have
to be charged with the duty to carry it out. If this conclusion is right,
then it surely holds for welfarist approaches that center capabilities,
rather than primary goods or virtue, as that which triggers and defines
the state's obligation.
But is it right? This existential argument also seems overbroad.
There is even less reason to think that rights, in order to be liberal
rights, must be based on a falsely atomistic account of our nature than
to think that rights, in order to be liberal rights, must be invariably
negative. Rights, in the liberal tradition, are justified by and emanate
from some conception of our human nature,47 but there is nothing in
the rights tradition per se that obligates it to honor a false conception
of our nature. Indeed, although classical liberals undoubtedly
highlighted our autonomy and our individuality, the centrality of the
"right to be left alone" to the rights tradition, and the neurotic
understanding of our atomistic nature on which such a right rests, is a
late nineteenth and early twentieth century invention. Such a view is
not "central" to liberalism and not required by the logic of rights; it is
47. See generally Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, supra note 26 (arguing that
rights derive from membership in the human community and the concept of political
equality). A serious regard for rights, Dworkin argues, rests on "the vague but
powerful idea of human dignity... [which] supposes that there are ways of treating a
man that are inconsistent with recognizing him as a full member of the human

community, and holds that such treatment is profoundly unjust." Id. at 198. H.L.A.
Hart and others have noted that Dworkin does not specify a sufficiently thick view of

human nature to sustain a strong case for any particular set of rights, thus
distinguishing him from classical liberal rights theorists such as Mill. See H.L.A. Hart,
Between Utility and Rights, in Ronald Dworkin and Contemporary Jurisprudence 214,
218 (Marshall Cohen ed., 1983). Nevertheless, Dworkin directly rests his defense of
the idea of rights itself on an appeal to a conception of human life, which he himself
labels "Kantian," and from which the basic rights to equal concern and respect are
directly derived. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, supra note 26, at 198-99. For
further examples of rights arguments that rely to varying degrees on specified
accounts of human nature, see, e.g., Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law
1302-08 (2d ed. 1988); Thomas C. Grey, Eros, Civilization and the Burger Court, 43
Law & Contemp. Probs., 83 Summer 1980; David A. J. Richards, Sexual Autonomy
and the Constitutional Right to Privacy: A Case Study in Human Rights and the
Unwritten Constitution, 30 Hastings L.J. 957, 964-72 (1979).
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central to liberal states, only to the extent that the state, the
Constitution, or the tradition that defines the content of the rights we
actually have, designate it as such. Rights could as readily be
grounded in a view of our nature that respects our individuality and
also gives full recognition to our social nature: our extended periods
of biological dependence on caregivers, the resulting dependence of
those caregivers on the support of others, our obligations to our
communities and neighborhoods, our civic and charitable duties, and
our responsibilities to engage in civic life. In short, neither negativity
nor atomism are necessary features of the rights tradition.
II. THE COSTS OF ABANDONING RIGHTS
So-why insist that they are? And what are the costs of doing so?
Some of the earliest and harshest critics of rights, particularly from the
critical legal studies movement, at various points conceded or insisted
upon the possibility of precisely the reformulation that I am
suggesting above.' Nevertheless, those same rights critics have urged
abandonment, not a reformulation, of rights and rights discourse. The
reason given for that urged abandonment, for the most part, has been
largely strategic or pragmatic, rather than theoretical or visionary. It
has also had quite an impact. Welfarist theorists have seemingly
turned their backs on rights as a possible vehicle for achieving (or
even articulating) the state obligations that they think are owed.
The argument roughly is this: rights, according to the most farreaching critics, are (almost) invariably negative," and (almost)
inevitably tied to a falsely insular conception of individual nature. 5'
They are also (almost) infinitely malleable, or indeterminate, and
accordingly easily co-opted, or subject to capture."' For both reasons,
while they may from time to time guarantee a measure of individual
freedom, they also-and (almost) inexorably-are co-opted by larger
forces and reformulated, so as to frustrate rather than promote the
good society. However they are initially conceived, and with
whatever good intentions and progressive motivations, rights end up
insulating inequalities, disabling the state from redistributive
regulatory governance, benefitting the privileged, giving false hope
and a false sense of security to the subordinated, teaching complicity
in one's own disempowerment, and holding out the possibility of small
progressive steps forward only toward the end of co-opting their
beneficiaries, and ultimately securing large steps back. There is
nothing to gain and quite a bit to lose by even envisioning a
48. Gabel, Tushnet, and Horwitz all insisted on the contingency rather than the
necessity of rights' negativity and atornism. See Gabel, supra note 21, at 1586-90,
Horwitz, supra note 21, at 404-06; Tushnet, supra note 21, at 1379-80.
49. See Horwitz, supra note 21, at 399-400: Tushnet, supra note 21, at 1386-94.
50. Gabel, supra note 21, at 1566-71.
51. Horwitz, supra note 21, at 396-99; Tushnet, supra note 21, at 1371-84.
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progressive or positive alternative rights agenda, much less striving to
put one in place. The idea that we might profit from a reformulation
of rights as positive and honoring our social rather than asocial nature,
is worse than a harmless utopian chimera; it is a dangerous delusion.
If put in practice, it promises at most a pointless diversion of
resources. At worst, it promises continuing liberal complicity in the
work of injustice. It will leave us farther from, not closer to, a good
society, and farther from, not closer to, a state obligated to commit
itself to that end.
This is not a groundless worry. There is plenty in our recent and
not so recent history that explains the rights critics' most extreme
forms of rights skepticism. The rhetoric from the last great American
rights revolution-the civil rights movements of the fifties and
sixties-has indeed become the shell of the reactionary antiaffirmative action movement of the eighties, nineties and aughts. The
reproductive rights movement of the mid and late twentieth century
has similarly become nothing but a bare commodificationist right to
purchase an abortion, rather than a positive entitlement to exercise
meaningful autonomy or choice in one's reproductive life. 2 Negative
rights of free speech -fervently sought after by dissenters as a way to
protect the interests and liberties of persecuted pacifists, anarchists,
and communists at mid-century-have become, at the turn of the
century, the vehicle by which advertisers manipulate public desire
with impunity, and corporate wealth maintains its headlock on the
levers of political decision-making. 3 The peculiarly American socalled "right to bear arms," intended to protect the rights of colonial
citizens against a centralized, distant military force, has become
instead the means by which citizens terrorize each other, reducing the
state to such cartoonish sub-minimalism that the right threatens to
return us all to the very Hobbesian state of nature from which the
Leviathan promised deliverance. The rights critics have, in essence,
urged us to internalize the moral of these examples, and innoculate
ourselves against future delusions. This is the way of all rights
movements, hopes, and ambitions. There is no articulable right that
will not eventually, and sooner more likely than later, become the
vehicle for reactionary politics. The entrenchment of the status quo
achieved by such a discourse is never worth whatever momentary gain
might be had through an expansion of rights.

52. Others have criticized Roe on these grounds. See Catharine MacKinnon,
Feminism Unmodified: Discourses on Life and the Law 99-101 (1987); Eileen L.
McDonagh, Breaking the Abortion Deadlock: From Choice to Consent 46-48 (1996);
Catharine A. MacKinnon, Reflections on Sex Equality Under Law, 100 Yale L.J. 1281,
1308-24 (1991).
53. See generally, Cass R. Sunstein, Democracy and the Problem of Free Speech
(1993) (suggesting a reassessment of the guarantee of free speech in light of current
trends and developments).
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There are, however, costs in abandoning rights, rather than joining
the debate regarding their substance. The first is rhetorical. It
concerns the nature of moral, aspirational discourse, and the relative
power or impoverishment of the rhetoric with which such discourse is
articulated. When architects of the good society disown rights, they
distance themselves from a tradition that has been unduly attentive to
individualistic needs for property, contract, and privacy, and
insufficiently attentive to human and social needs for safe intimacy,
civic participation, meaningful work, or basic welfare goods. But they
also distance themselves from a discourse that whatever its historic
shortcomings is also explicitly utopian, moralistic, and imperativist.
The rights tradition directs states and state actors to attend to what we
might universally share, and to focus on the utopian aspirations we
might universally hold, and then to bring that vision to earth. Rights
are morally grounded imperatives, not a list of suggestions for good
governance. It is a language that requires lawmakers to think in terms
of what we morally ought to do and be. Good society advocates
should not loosely turn their backs on a discourse which has
historically been the means by which we marry our moral beliefs
about governance to ethical imperativism. There aren't all that many
ways by which critics, citizens, or even legislators can make the point
that moral judgment rather than realpolitik ought to-and mustguide the business of politics. It is not so clear that the abandonment,
rather than reform, of one such language-whatever may be its
flaws-is a wise strategy for good society advocates, or will prove to
be a benefit for the party of humanity.
The second cost of abandoning rights is borne by the state of
normative legal scholarship. When good society theorists who are
also lawyers heed the critics' call to abandon rights talk, the
development, through scholarship, of alternative directions legal
doctrine could take toward the realization of that good society, bears
the mark of that abandonment. To a considerable degree we can
already trace the effects of that retreat. We still lack a credible,
broad-based, coherent jurisprudence of welfare rights, Frank
Michelman's herculean efforts of twenty-five years ago
notwithstanding.' We might lack this jurisprudence, in part, because
those who might othervise have been inclined to contribute to that
jurisprudence have been convinced not only of the futility of the
project, but also of its counterproductivity. We lack a credible
jurisprudence of education rights, and it is at least possible that we
lack it, in part, due to that same skepticism. We lack a jurisprudence
of dignitary rights, labor rights, and environmental rights-and, as I
will discuss in a little more detail, doulia rights, or rights to provide
54. Michelman, Constitutional Welfare Rights, supra note 3: Michelman. On
Protectingthe Poor,supra note 3.
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care. We lack them in part because those who might produce the
scholarship have become convinced that rights and rights talk cannot
be productively turned to the work of achieving or even conceiving a
good society, and might even undercut it. Obviously, other factors as
well have played a role-a hostile Supreme Court is only the most
obvious. Additionally, the turn among some leftist scholars to an
explicitly antinormative, skeptical postmodernism has also fueled a
late-century retreat from visionary, utopian scholarship, including
rights scholarship that might aim to carve out a constitutional
argument for a state obligation to secure the minimal preconditions of
a good society. Nevertheless, the explicit disavowal of rights by both
rights critics and good society advocates is a part of that story, as well
as reflective of it.
Third, there is a doctrinal cost paid when lawyers, and not just
social theorists, abandon rather than seek to reform rights and rights
talk. The abandonment of rights discourse by those committed to
constructing a good society through law, goes some way toward
rendering the rights critique a self-fulfilling prophecy. When lawyers
forgo the task of creating a positive rights jurisprudence, they also
forgo the opportunity to assert a credible counterweight, within
doctrine and within rights-structured doctrinal discourse, to the
assertion of negative rights which do indeed undercut the good
society, and in precisely the ways urged by the critics. With no
credible counterweight, when a negative right of the sort the rights
critics lament is asserted, it is typically met not with a positive right
that might counter it, but instead with a claimed "policy" to be
weighed against it. But rights, as both their proponents and critics
know, trump policy; that is their function. If we had what we
currently do not have-a developed jurisprudence of positive and
relational rights, constructed around the ideal of the good societythen a negative, individualist right might alternatively, or additionally,
be met in the courts of law and in the courts of public opinion, with
the claim that it conflicts with a positive one. Conflicting rights, as
Dworkin reminds us, do not "trump" each other; rather, conflicting
rights must be read in such a way as to reduce the conflict.
Proponents of the good society have been dissuaded, in part by the
rights critique itself, from developing the jurisprudence that might
counter the rights decried by that critique.
Let me illustrate with one example. In Texas two years ago, a
federal district court held that a man's constitutional right to bear
arms was unconstitutionally abridged by a federal law that forbade
domestic violence offenders from owning firearms."
The judge
accordingly struck down the law as unconstitutional. In that case, the
state attempted, unsuccessfully, to meet the defendant's claimed
55. United States v. Emerson, 46 F. Supp. 2d 598, 610-11 (N.D. Tex. 1999).
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assertion of the negative right to bear arms by arguing that the Second
Amendment right on which the defendant rested his case does not
exist.56 The court rejected the argument that if the right does exist, it
should be balanced, weighed against, or limited by, a policy favoring
public safety? But policy arguments do not win against asserted
rights. They are not supposed to. The very logic of a right-that it
must be protected even in the face of sound policies that conflict with
it-virtually assures as much. Again, rights, by definition, trump
policy. It is inherent in rights that they do so. In this case, once the
court accepted the dubious premise that there exists an individual
right to bear arms, there could be no effective rejoinder.
Alternatively, if there had existed a developed understanding of
positive rights to which the state might have turned, the negative right
to bear arms asserted in the Texas case could have been met not
simply with a policy favoring disarmament of violent domestic
abusers, but with a claimed right. After making the sound and central
claim that no such Second Amendment right exists, the state could
have proceeded to urge that even if the right to bear arms exists, it
must be understood in such a way as not to conflict with our more
fundamental positive right to a liberal state that is obligated to protect
us against private violence. Such a right, had it been asserted, could
not be trumped by a conflicting right. The judge would have been
forced to reconcile, in a principled way, the asserted right to bear arms
with the civil right to be protected by the state against private
violence. How the court would have achieved that reconciliation is an
open question; the claim that the negative right to bear arms would
have to be limited so as to accommodate the positive right to be
protected against a known threat of violence from an identified
offender with a history of abuse, may or may not have proven
persuasive. It likely would not have proven persuasive to the judge
that wrote the majority opinion-although it may have captured the
legal imagination of a judge writing in dissent. My point here is only
that the rights critique-along with a host of other factors-dissuades
us from the need to build the case for the constitutional rejoinder.
That alone is a cost.
It is not hard to imagine other examples. Property owners and,
increasingly, courts argue that environmental regulations that impact
the value of privately held property unconstitutionally restrict the
property owners' various negative rights of property. Such a claim,
one might think, ought ideally to be met with a robust argument that
we have a positive right to a state that protects our wilderness, air,
water, and public health. Instead, it is typically met by a plea that the
property owner's multiple and conceded negative rights to own
56. Id- at 600.
57. Id. at 609-10.
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property free of state regulation ought to be balanced against
environmental policy. But again, in a rights versus policy debate, the
right will trump. The consequence, for environmentalism, of
abandoning the attempt to construct a positive jurisprudence of
environmental rights, is clearly not good. In a similar vein, the claim
that a landlord's contract and property rights are infringed by laws
requiring him to rent to couples regardless of sexual orientation, is
met only by the hope that the court will in its discretion come to view
such non-discrimination laws as protecting compelling state interests,
rather than by a strongly asserted positive right to shelter, unburdened
by litmus tests of moral propriety. The claim that a propagandist's
hate speech is unconstitutionally infringed by a speech regulation, or
that broadcasters' news coverage is unconstitutionally infringed by
broadcast regulations, is met by asserted policies protecting interests
in freedom from harm or fairness, rather than with the claim that
liberalism ought properly honor not only our negative rights to be free
of censorship, but also our positive rights to a political dialogue
unpolluted by hate or profit. In short, without a tradition of positive
rights on which to draw, we meet constitutional claims of negative
speech rights, property rights, contract rights, and gun rights with
exhortations of policy-exhortations which sometimes are but more
often aren't heard, and when they are heard, are then readily
trumped. But that these cases are all posed as, and understood as,
asserted rights on the one hand, and policies on the other, does not
bode well for the regulatory state. Again-rights, by definition, trump
policy. Negative rights, unchecked by positive rights that might
counter them, threaten to reduce that regulatory state to the vanishing
point. Such a reduction would hardly be a victory for the party of
humanity. More pointedly, a regulatory state reduced to the
vanishing point is clearly not one that is obligated to secure minimal
preconditions of a fully human life.
Lastly, the failure to articulate a positive rights jurisprudence that
includes a state's obligation to ensure the minimal preconditions of
the good society has resulted in the lack of a meaningful
counterweight, not only within rights discourse, but also to counter
the balancing of costs and benefits that now dominates ordinary, or
non-rights-based, legal analysis. As a result, legal analysis, across the
map, is now driven in toto either by the logic of negative rights, or in
the absence of rights, by an economic calculus that funnels all values
into monetary equivalents, assigning some to the cost and some to the
benefit side of the ledger, and then balancing the one against the
other, according victory to whichever comes out on top. The failure
to enrich the rights tradition with a positive rights jurisprudence and a
defensible conception of our social nature has thus facilitated the
ascendency of an economic method of legal analysis that relentlessly
asserts the comparability, fungibility, and commensurability of all
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values, translates values into dollar terms, and leads to the ease of
trading off one against the other. The cost of health is balanced
against lost profits, the value of future life is measured against present
dollars, the cost of suffering against the cost of prevention, the
monetary benefits of speech against the cost of permitting it, the cost
of sexual harassment against the benefits of non-intervention. This
cost-benefit analysis has widely recognized and well-known pitfalls: it
relies on real or shadow market values that are themselves reflective
of little but the forces of profit; it ferociously solidifies and legitimates
the status quo by ignoring the effects of given distributions on felt
entitlements; it discriminates between us by valuing our lives
differently on the basis of our projected or actual incomes; it creates a
wealth-based mentality that measures all, including goodness, truth
and justice, by reference to profit. But for all of its problems-for all
of its well-known absurdities-cost-benefit analysis now dominates
legal analysis. It does so primarily for the absence of credible
normative alternatives.
Here again, this is a loss felt not only in theory but in doctrine as
well. As Lisa Heinzerling demonstrates, costs of environmental
protection to individuals and corporations, for example, are balanced
against the benefits to individuals, where these benefits of health and
well-being are then measured by projected incomes, and then
discounted by various factors, such as the proximity to us of the lives
in question, in terms of either time or distance. Rather than present a
rights-based challenge to this entire normative apparatus, advocates of
environmental regulation instead debate the amounts, challenge the
discount rates, or question various economic assumptions behind the
economic models. What we do not hear, even from committed
environmentalists, is a principled moral and legal argument that we
are entitled by right-meaning regardlessof cost-to some degree of
state-protected environmental health. Accident victims and their
advocates similarly tally their costs in lottery-styled torts cases, rather
than assert a right to health care to which we are entitled, as a matter
of right. Sexually harassed workers or their advocates debate the
subtleties of the value of a harassment free environment as implied by
their employment contracts, rather than assert a right to dignified
labor. Our legal system, as well as our discourse, has been thoroughly
transformed by cost-benefit econometrics, and without a rights
discourse to offset, trump, or challenge it, there is little relief in sight.
By eschewing rights and rights talk, we have arguably engendered a
more efficient state. But we have not noticeably moved any closer to
achieving, or conceiving, the good society.
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III. TOWARD A JURISPRUDENCE OF POSITIVE AND
RELATIONAL RIGHTS

What might be worth considering, in light of the costs of the rights
critique, is the possibility of revitalizing the rights tradition, rather
than abandoning it altogether. Doing so may advance the end of
constructing liberal rights that protect and guarantee, not just
individual autonomy, but also fundamental capabilities. What might a
liberal state look like, if it employed positive and relational rights, as
well as negative and individualist rights, and conceived of those rights
as directed toward the protection of both capabilities and autonomy?
There would no doubt be many similarities. As Nussbaum and
others have argued, a state committed to ensuring material
preconditions of the good society would also be committed to
ensuring many of the negative rights now understood as essential to a
liberal state. 8 The major difference would lie in what additional
rights would be regarded as being in the "core," and in the nature of
the penumbral rights that might be inferred from that core. Our
current liberal state, structured by negative and atomistic rights, and
committed to securing the minimal preconditions of participation not
in a good society, but in a free society, has in its core, rights of
autonomy, contract and property. These are all now interpreted,
variously, so as to ward off the danger of an overly zealous state. By
contrast, a liberal state similarly structured by rights, but committed to
securing the minimal preconditions of capabilities as well as
autonomy, would explicitly recognize additional fundamental rights,
including welfare rights and rights to work, currently unrecognized or
underrecognized by liberal states overly committed to the atomism
and negativity of rights. It would also recognize two rights currently
underrecognized by liberal states and undertheorized by welfare
advocates. Both of these core rights are highlighted rather than
marginalized by the "fundamental capabilities" approach of
Nussbaum and Sen.
The first right, I would call a right to security against private
violence. The rationale of this right is essentially Hobbesian, and laid
out above. As Hobbes claimed, our nature is such that the state must
monopolize the tools and instruments of violence if our lives are to be
relatively secure. Security against private violence is the core,
material precondition of our capability for living safely and free of
fear, and hence of meaningfully participating in a good life or good
society. In terms of modern utopianists, we cannot lead "fully human
lives" without such a right. In Hobbesian terms, we would not have a
58. Nussbaum, Women and Human Development, supra note 8, at 111-66.
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state without it-it is the right for which we relinquish natural
freedoms. The state therefore has an obligation-a first duty-to
protect citizens against private violence and aggression, including
private sexual violence and aggression. It has that obligation, or first
duty, because such an obligation is necessary to the creation of a good
society. Again, we cannot lead "fully human" lives otherwise.
A liberal state that fails to provide such protection violates the
individual's right to that protection, as well as the state's "first duty"
to provide it.59 What might follow from the existence of such a right?
A state that failed to criminalize, or failed to enforce existing laws that
criminalize, domestic violence, for example, or marital rape, or
violence against lesbians and gay men, or people of color, would
violate those citizens' right to protection, and not just equal
protection, of the law. Likewise, a state that turned its police force on
its citizenry, rather than employed it in their protection, would violate
positive rights to protection as well as a negative right to be free from
unwarranted state intrusion. These would be clear, unequivocal
violations of the citizen's most fundamental right and the state's most
fundamental duty. Less blatant, and even unintentional or neglectful
failures to protect citizens from violence, however, might also violate
such a right. A failure, for example, to enact adequate gun control
legislation so as to ensure the safety of school children, women, or
urban residents, might constitute a failure to provide for the safety of
citizens, and hence violate their rights to protection of the law. A
consistent pattern of punishing violence against a group of citizens
more leniently than the same crimes committed against another more
favored group might also constitute such a violation, as Randall
Kennedy argued some time ago.'
What might be the penumbral rights implied by the recognition of a
core positive right to protection against private violence? It would
depend on the rationale of the core right itself. Three possibilities
come to mind. First, if we have a positive right to protection against
private violence because of our natural vulnerability to the violent
propensities of others, and the calamitous consequences of that
vulnerability, then we might also want to recognize that we have a
positive right to the state's protection against other sorts of natural
"violence" with equally calamitous results. We might, for example,
have a positive right to be protected against natural disaster,
misfortune, or even disfavor and bad luck, if the consequences of that
disfavor are brutal. This might sensibly be regarded as the "welfarist"
interpretation of the right to security.

59. See Heyman, supra note 32, at 53045.
60. See Randall L. Kennedy, McClesky v. Kemp: Race, Capital Punishmnent, and
the Supreme Court, 101 Harv. L. Rev. 1388, 1421-29 (1988).
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Alternatively, we might reason that we recognize a positive right to
security, or protection against the violence of others, not because of
the calamitous potential consequences of our vulnerability to that
violence, but because of the potentially subordinating, and hence
inegalitarian, consequences of that vulnerability. Unchecked private
violence leads to unchecked private political hierarchies and also leads
to domination and acquiescence in those spheres in which the violence
goes unchecked by the state. A security right against unchecked
private violence, then, might imply not just a right to assistance in the
event of natural disaster, but a different set of "penumbral rights" to
be protected against extreme forms of private aggression, whether or
not that aggression takes the form of physical violence. We may, for
example, have a positive right to be protected against the harmful
effects of a polluted environment, or an unregulated and dangerous
product, or exploitative employers. We might think of this as the
"antisubordinationist" interpretation of the security right.
And third, we might reason that we have a positive right to security
against private violence because of a yet more fundamental right to
security against extreme deprivation or impoverishment that threatens
fundamental human capabilities, regardless of whether that
vulnerability can be attributed to either undue private aggression or
natural disaster. If we have a right to protection against violence not
because we have egalitarian rights not to be subordinated, and not
because we have a natural right to community assistance in the event
of natural disaster, but because we have a right to a fully human life
free of fear and anxiety brought on by conditions of deprivation, then
we might impliedly also have a right to be freed of these nonsubordinating but no less damaging sorts of vulnerabilities. This
would be the most far-reaching penumbral interpretation of the right
to security, and might be called the "capabilities-based"
interpretation. We have a right to security, in this view, because we
have a right to live the "fully human" life such security in part ensures.
A liberalism grounded in a "first right" to protection against private
violence, so understood, in other words, might support the existence
of penumbral rights to protection against other sorts of
vulnerabilities-and hence, at the outer reaches, rights to whatever is
minimally necessary to attain those capabilities in turn essential to a
fully human life. Obviously, such rights would entail state obligations
to act, rather than simply refrain from acting.
The second core right that might be recognized in a liberal tradition
unwedded to atomism can be called a "right to provide care," or as
the philosopher Eva Kittay refers to it, a right to doulia.6 This right is
currently undertheorized in the welfarist literature. We do not,
contrary to Hobbesian myth, spring upon this earth mushroom style,
61. See Kittay, supra note 23, at 132.
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as fully formed, autonomous adults. Rather, all of us enjoy or suffer
an extended period of absolute dependency upon caregivers, and most
of us, as adults, enjoy or suffer (or both) an even longer period during
which we bestow care upon infants and children dependent upon us,
and eventually upon aging parents in similar need. The ability to give
care to dependent others, and the ability to receive such care as a
dependent other, is at least as fundamental to a "fully human life" as
is the ability to rest secure against threats of private violence or
subordination. As a species, we are not just interdependent creatures,
we are also, for substantial periods, fully dependent upon others, and
others are, for substantial periods, fully dependent upon us. Those
simple facts of our human existence, to a considerable degree, mark
our species, define and constitute our moral sense, and form the basis
for our social nature.
As a consequence, when we are infants and children, and likewise
when we are sick or aged, we desperately need, not the rights of
autonomy and independence so central to classical liberalism, but a
regime that protects us in our dependent state, and protects those
upon whom we are dependent as well. And, when we are acting as
caregivers, we need not rights that falsely presuppose our autonomy
and independence, but rights that frankly acknowledge our relational
reality. When infants, children, or aging parents are dependent upon
us, we are dependent upon others for support and sustenance. 2
People who are providing care to dependents are themselves in need
of assistance from others, and caregivers will eventually become,
again, dependents in need of care themselves. That circle of mutual
need, caregiving, dependency, and assistance is as much a part of our
social contract as is the individual's relinquishment of rights to selfdefense in exchange for a right to protection against violence. A
rights tradition that forthrightly acknowledged the natural reality of
our inescapable dependence on each other-to say nothing of our
social nature-would give pride of place to "relational rights" that
would protect the caregiver, and hence the care bestowed in
dependency relationships.
Needless to say, perhaps, such relational rights are nowhere
mentioned in various constitutional documents, nor are they wellgrounded in liberal theory. But they ought to be. We have the rights
we have in liberal, democratic societies, at least according to widely
shared conventional wisdom, for essentially one (or more) of three
basic reasons. First, we construct or recognize rights when, for some
reason, the sphere of life, service, freedom, activity, or identity that is
protected by the right, and so necessary to flourishing, might
nevertheless be systematically undervalued, underappreciated, or
underprotected by standard political or economic processes, even in a
62. For a sustained argument to this effect, see generally i., at 132.46.
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liberal democracy. Second, at least sometimes in the United States
and elsewhere, we construct rights when we have reason to believe
that a particular practice or activity, if unchecked, will have a severe
and adverse effect on a subgroup that has historically been
subordinated. And lastly, here and elsewhere, at least on occasion, we
construct rights to underscore our most fundamental and most shared
intergenerational values. The panoply of rights we protect expresses
our self understanding, and more specifically, it expresses a selfunderstanding meant to endure even in times of the value's political
neglect.
Does this widely shared, and I think, uncontroversial understanding
of the various rationales for rights suggest a basis for a right to give
care, and a right to the doulia needed to support it? I think so. First,
we have very good reason to think that standard political and
economic tools will not generate market or political protections for
this labor, or for those who provide it. Caregivers do not, as a rule,
willy-nilly abandon infants or dependents, take a better opportunity as
it arises, or go on strike, even under very harsh conditions.
Caregivers, virtually by definition, are emotionally and ethically
committed to perform the work without interruption once it is
undertaken. That emotional and ethical attachment of caregiver and
cared-for that results from caregiving labor strongly suggests that the
work will be less supported than it should be in both democratic
political systems and market economies. Caregivers have all of the
vulnerability, but none of the autonomy, which comes from the "at
will" employment status they share with other vulnerable employees.
There is no political will or need to support caregiving labor and no
organizational ability to confront that lack of will with some set of
non-negotiable "caregivers' demands," so long as caregivers continue
to provide the services regardless, enduring either impoverishment or
dependency as the cost of doing so. We therefore have good reason
to believe that familial and economic institutions, if unchecked, will
continue to undercompensate caregiving labor, and that women will
be adversely impacted, as a group, by that practice.
For this
unexceptional reason, familiar to liberal theorists, we need rights of
care to protect caregivers against the pendulum swings of public
support and neglect of their work.
Likewise, we need rights of care to protect women from the
inegalitarian consequences of that neglect, just as we need rights of
nondiscrimination to protect potential employees from the adverse
consequences of irrational racism. It is increasingly clear that some
such panoply of relational rights is necessary if women, who have
traditionally assumed the work of unassisted caregiving with no
correlative state obligation to protect them in that work, and who
have suffered either the risk of impoverishment or subordination by
virtue of doing so, are to enjoy any measure of equality in an
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otherwise liberal and autonomy-protecting society. In a related point,
such rights are necessary if caregivers, whether men or women, are to
enjoy the rights of autonomy promised them by conventional
liberalism.
Lastly, we need a right of care and a right to supported caregiving
labor to better express our self-understanding as a species for whom
caregiving is a central life activity. Clearly, our nature is such that we
thrive when cared for. As a species, our period of infantile need is
extended over time, as is our period of caregiving labor. We flourish
both individually and communally when decent care is provided, and
we suffer when it is not. The better the care, the more the cared-for
will thrive, and the more likely they will mature to become liberal and
equal citizens who can themselves provide care as well as fulfill
responsibilities of citizenship in a liberal society. And, the more
demanding and consuming is the care, the harder it is to provide
without support.
But most fundamentally, liberalism ought to recognize such rights
because such rights are necessary to a good and liberal society,
virtually regardless of how that society is defined. Those who give
care to dependents over extended periods of time need material
security against need, if that care is to be of high quality. One cannot
see to the needs of an infant or an elderly parent and engage in wageearning labor at the same time; caregiving labor, by its nature, renders
the caregiver less autonomous. Falsely assuming that we can, is
ultimately as disastrous and self-destructive as falsely assuming that
grown people will naturally and peacefully cohabit in the state of
nature. An artificial, socially constructed, civil Leviathan has proven
necessary to protect us against the second false illusion-the illusion
of our own invulnerability and natural sociability.
A similarly
artificial, socially constructed, civil network of support ought to be
created to protect us against the first-the illusion of our natural
independence.
A right to give care without risking severe
impoverishment or subordination, grounded in our nature, and
protective of the caregiver's security, safety and material well-being
when she relinquishes her independence so as to care for the needs of
dependent others, should be a part of that social construction.
Thus, all three rationales for rights-the dysfunction of political and
economic processes for protecting caregiving labor; the inegalitarian
consequences for an historically subordinated group of not doing so;
and our self-understanding that caregiving is important work-point
in the direction of care and doulia rights. Whether we are presently in
a "constitutional moment" which might support the creation of such a
right is of course an open question. We may now be in a period when
the jurisprudential will to support caregiving labor in any way other
than through traditional family structures is at an all time low. But we
are also in a political period when the need for such a right has
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become clear to many people who historically have had no sense of it
whatsoever: men, who are actually doing caregiving labor, and are
consequently experiencing some of the risks of that work. Women
and men who are caring for dependents know they need support, and
they also know that complete economic dependency upon a marital
partner in an unequal economic relationship is not a viable long term
solution to the problem. A right to support for caregiving labor might
then express that quite fundamental shift in our collective and social
self-understanding.
What might be the practical consequences of such a right? Mothers
or fathers caring for infants, and adult children caring for aging
parents, protected by rights to care, might be possessed both of
penumbral negative rights, recognized "inside the courts," against
unwise state action that endangers caregiving, caregivers, and the
cared-for, such as the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity
Reconciliation Act of 1996,63 and positive rights, "outside the courts,"
to state action that supports care-giving labor, such as an expanded
version of the Family and Medical Leave Act.' Of course, such a
right would be subject to interpretation, change, and re-interpretation
in light of changing politics and circumstances, no less than are rights
of privacy or speech. And, such a right, or rights, would share in the
risks and pitfalls of rights generally, as exposed by rights critics. A
"right to care" could be subject to capture in ways both imaginable
and unimaginable. Or it may be subject (I think) more importantly, to
trivialization-the right could well become, and in short order,
nothing but a commodificationist right to hire a nanny of one's free
choosing, or a right to be a nanny and set one's own low wage and bad
working conditions unimpeded by meddlesome and paternalistic labor
regulations.
Nevertheless, we shouldn't dismiss the upside potential out of hand.
A "right to care" would share in the rhetorical power of rights
discourse. Acknowledgment or insistence upon the existence of such
a right would honor the centrality of caregiving labor to social life.
Neither would it require a herculean effort to locate such a right in
our constitutional history. The substantive due process clause, before
it became, post-Eisenstadtv. Baird,6 5 the source of individual, negative
rights to contraception and abortion, did prominently include "a right
to parent" 66-a right which, particularly if modernized and coupled
with our current recognition of the constitutional status of norms of
63. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996,
Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 7
U.S.C., 8 U.S.C., 21 U.S.C., 25 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.).
64. 29 U.S.C. § 2601 (1994).
65. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
66. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316
U.S. 535, 541 (1942); Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925); Meyer v.
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
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gender equality-could easily be viewed as "penumbral" to a more
fundamental right to give care. As a practical matter, as mentioned,
such a right casts doubt on not just the wisdom but also the
constitutionality of legislation like the mid 1990s welfare reform act, a'
and such a right, were we to recognize it, gives needed dimensions of
both universality and moral imperative to political demands for
greater support of vulnerable caregivers. Just as important, a "'right to
care," if recognized, would go a long way toward aligning the idea of
rights with a conception of our nature that acknowledges our natural
dependencies as well as our social responsibilities toward others,
rather than a conception of our nature that insists falsely and
dangerously on our self-sufficiency.
CONCLUSION: RIGHTS, CAPABILITIES, LIBERALISM AND THE
MATERIAL PRECONDITIONS OF THE GOOD SOCIETY

Even if successful, of course, this imaginative reconstruction of
rights from negative to positive and from atomistic to relational does
not establish that any of these welfarist rights to enjoy basic
capabilities actually exist. A right-whether to anti-subordination, to
give care, to dignified labor, to a living wage, to welfare -must also be
found in the language, logic or history of a state or a nation's
constitution. Rights we actually have, rather than rights we could
have, must, to use Dworkin's suggestive phrase, confront the brute
facts of our legal history.' Constitutions may or may not explicitly
provide for positive rights, and constitutions that do not do so may or
may not be read so as to implicitly endorse them. There is, of course,
a great deal of scholarship in constitutional democracies debating the
interpretive limits and possibilities of particular constitutional
provisions. Much of that debate, furthermore, goes to the possibility
of locating either positive or relational rights or both within a
document that seemingly only provides for negative and atomistic
rights.
Nevertheless, one obstacle to the recognition of positive and
relational rights within both liberal constitutional discourse and
welfarist theory, stems not from brute fact of constitutional law and
history, but rather from the widely held conviction that the notion of a
positive right or a relational right is somehow oxymoronic-that rights
by definition constrain states from certain acts, rather than requiring
of them certain acts, and that rights by definition valorize
individualism and denigrate dependency. These are circular claims
that ought to be laid to rest, both for the sake of liberalism, and its
67. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996,

110 Stat. 2105.
68. Ronald Dworkin, Law's Empire 255-56 (1986): see also Dworkin, Taking
Rights Seriously, supra note 26, at 81-149 (arguing that although a judge may not
invent rights, existing rights should be interpreted from an activist perspective).
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apparently forsaken humanistic core, and for welfarism, at least a
welfarism that has any legal bite.
Let me start with liberalism. If rights exist, and if as liberals
generally contend, they are justified by reference to our human
nature, then they surely direct as well as constrain states: states must
act as well as refrain from acting if they are to provide for civic liberty,
equality, well-being, and the "full human lives" of citizens. 69 The
liberal tradition, generously read, requires states to protect our
individualistic capacity for free thought and our desire to master our
own fate, and it requires states to do so by refraining from
paternalistic intrusion.
It also, however, generously read, as
Nussbaum has argued, requires states to protect our capabilities: our
capability for self rule, for safe intimacy, for a healthy and long life,
and for productive work, and it requires states to do so because these
capabilities, among others, are essential for us to lead fully human
lives. The rights needed to provide that protection are distinctively
positive. If they are at the heart of liberalism, then the widely held
belief that liberalism can at most embrace a negative understanding of
rights is mistaken.
Second, if committed to a full and true conception of our social as
well as autonomous nature, rather than a truncated one that denies
the former and valorizes the latter, liberal rights and hence liberalism
itself could be aligned with the work of fashioning a social fabric that
protects us in our cross-generational web of dependencies, rather than
one that blithely ignores them. Our capacity for caring over extended
periods of time for those who are dependent upon us is at least as
central to our human identity as our capacity for free thought, our
propensity to bargain through contracts, or the security we gain
through our possessions. The nature and quality of the care we
bestow upon those who are dependent upon us mark our species, and
as a set of practices, generates an ethical way of being in the world
that is at least as integral both to a well-led individual life and to the
well-being of our communities, as is our individualized capacity for
autonomous conviction or independent action." A liberalism that
embraced at its core a right to give care without incurring unjustified
vulnerability-a liberalism that would marry, so to speak, a
recognition of the importance of caregiving labor to the well-being of
the species with the robustness of the liberal rights tradition-would
thereby acknowledge a relational and communitarian world
substantially different from the overly atomized individualistic hell
currently decried by liberalism's critics. A liberal society defined in
part by its recognition of rights to care, and a liberal culture that took
69. See also Cass R. Sunstein & Stephen Holmes, The Cost of Rights: Why
Liberty Depends on Taxes 54-58 (1999) ("Protection 'against' government is
therefore unthinkable without protection 'by' government.").
70. Carol Gilligan, In a Different Voice 64-105 (1982).
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the care to embellish its assumptions, would enrich, not undermine,
the egalitarianism and individualism of citizens that the liberal rights
tradition, to its credit, has always sought to foster. It would also
further, rather than hinder, attempts to construct a good society, and
it would do so by obligating the state to fulfill the material
preconditions of at least this one quite basic human capability.
And finally, what do good society advocates have to gain by
articulating the basis for the state's obligation to ensure the minimal
preconditions of the good society in the liberal terms of citizens'
rights? Most important, if proponents of a welfarist version of the
good society were to revitalize and refashion rights rather than
abandon them, they won't risk losing either the utopian universalism,
or the imperativism, that the liberal rights tradition has long lent to
political and legal practices. The language of rights connects politics
with not just the hope, but the demand, that law both can and should
structure a decent social world: rights are justified demands against a
state, not just a catalog of ideas of good governance. How we
conceive of that "decent social world" is clearly a political question,
and in a conservative and libertarian time, the language of rights will
reflect those politics-the rights we have or recognize will always
reflect the dominant political discourse, and our dominant political
discourse now is both conservative and libertarian. But it does not
follow that rights have a necessary connection to those or any other
set of political ideals; nor does it mean that those who envision a
different political ideal than the reigning one should abandon it.
Rights, whatever their content, are premised on the grandly
egalitarian assumption that we have a shared nature, from which
universal norms follow. If proponents of the good society give up on
rights, they will have given up on one way of envisioning our fate in a
way that honors that humanity.
There are, of course, many ways to think of and envision ideals, and
it is true that political actors, no less than legal actors, can articulate
visions, and urge political action on behalf of them, in language that
makes no reference to our rights. It is not the case that without rights
talk, good society theorists-whether welfarists or civic virtueists or
capabilities advocates-are automatically reduced to the realpolitik of
costs, benefits, preferences, markets, and sites of power and influence.
There are other ways-alternatives to rights and efficiency both-to
think about what a good society ought to be and what the state in a
good society ought to do. Nevertheless, rights are and have been one
way of asserting claims about what society ought to be, and what the
state ought to do, and what the state must do, with respect to our laws,
on behalf of all humanity.7 1 When proponents of the good society
71. See Hendrik Hartog, The Constitution of Aspiration and "Tie Rights That
Belong to Us All", 74 J. Am. His. 1017, 1024-25 (1987).
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turn their backs on rights, they relinquish one way of insisting that
moral judgment, moral choice, and moral vision-and not just
interests, preferences, votes, power, and money-guide political and
legal action. They turn their backs on a path-not the only path, but a
path-for transforming those universalistic utopian ideals of the good
society into political realities.

